Journal of Air Law and Commerce
Volume 9

Issue 4

Article 11

1938

Report on the Proposed Uniform Aeronautical Code

Recommended Citation
Report on the Proposed Uniform Aeronautical Code, 9 J. AIR L. & COM. 679 (1938)
https://scholar.smu.edu/jalc/vol9/iss4/11

This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Journal of Air Law and Commerce by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For
more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.

REPORT ON THE PROPOSED UNIFORM
AERONAUTICAL CODE*
Pursuant to your appointment of July 10, the undersigned
committee has studied the "Uniform Aviation Liability Act," the
"Uniform Law of Airflight," and the "Uniform Air Jurisdiction
Act," as prepared by the Special Committee on Uniform Aeronautical Code at the national conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.
This committee has not had a meeting. A meeting was called
for Cleveland September 2nd, but only two of the five members
could attend. However, views have been exchanged by correspondence between all of the members of the committee, and the following is our unanimous report:
UNIFORM AVIATION LIABILITY ACT

This is the first of the three proposed uniform codes. The
general scheme and plan of this act is to make the "operators" of
aircraft absolutely liable for all injuries to passengers and to persons and property on the ground and for loss of or damage to
baggage and "personal effects." Passenger and baggage liability
is limited to those operators carrying passengers and baggage for
hire.
Offsetting this absolute liability is a limitation of the sums
recoverable. As a part of the limitation of the sums recoverable is
a requirement of liability insurance, or bond, or cash deposit from
all operators, sufficient to cover the liabilities imposed by the act.
Behind this scheme and plan of legislation lies the honest belief
of the framers that
(a) The present laws on the subject of liability of aviation
operators, as developed by the court decisions, are uncertain, conflicting, and unsatisfactory.
(b) It is next to impossible for persons injured, or for the
representatives of persons killed, to obtain competent evidence to
prove negligence, if any.
(c) For this reason, plaintiffs should not be required to prove
negligence or to rebut -the evidence of the operators that there was
no negligence.
* Report to the President of the National Association of State Aviation
Officials, from the Special Study Committee.
George B. Logan, Chairman,
Howard C. Knotts, Charles L. Morris, Raymond R. Staub, Gill Robb Wilson.
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(d) Therefore, the operators should be held absolutely liable.
(e)
Hence, the liability should be limited in amount-providing the operator is insured or otherwise insures payment.
(f)
It, therefore, should be-made unlawful to fly without the
required insurance.
With this reasoning, your committee cannot agree. The errors
in the reasoning are, in our opinion, and as briefly as possible, as
follows:
(a) The present law on the subject of liability, as developed
by court decisions, is not uncertain nor conflicting nor unsatisfactory. Approximately one hundred cases (including lower court
and appellate court decisions) have been tried arising out of liabilities claimed for injuries in aviation. These cases embraced the
entire possible gamut of relationships. They included paid passengers, guest passengers, passengers of common carriers, passengers of private carriers, passengers of non-commercial operators.
They included employees on duty and not on duty, persons and
property on the ground. They included collisions in the air and
collisions between aircraft and other aircraft and objects on the
ground.
Practically without exception, the following well-defined rules
of law have been applied from precedents in other fields and these
ruless are as follows:
(a) That common carriers owe to their passengers the duty
of exercising the highest degree of care, but they are not insurers
and may successfully defend if not negligent.
(b) Private carriers for hire, as well as operators for pleasure,
owe to their passengers, paid or guest, the duty of exercising ordinary care under the circumstances, which is, of course, a high
degree of care, but they are not insurers.
(c) The burden is upon the plaintiff to prove a failure to
exercise the required degree of care just as it is in all cases arising
out of other types of transportation such as trains, buses, taxicabs,
automobiles, etc.
(d) The rule of "res ipsa loquitur," a rule of evidence, a
presumption of negligence arising from the happening, is being
generally and more frequently applied. While the burden remains
upon the plaintiff to prove negligence, this rule of evidence requires the defendant to explain or prove that the occurrence was
not due to his negligence.
These principles of law, as developed in aviation cases, are
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not unsatisfactory. The air operators have not complained of the
application of these rules. Nor is there any demand for a change
on the part of the air traveling public. A great majority of cases
actually tried have resulted in verdicts for the plaintiffs. The law
is developing satisfactorily, with uniformity, and with sufficient
speed.
We do not agree with the statement that it is "next to impossible" for plaintiffs to prove negligence. It may be difficult to
show exactly what happened in the air, but such a showing is not
requisite to prove negligence. As said before, in the great majority
of cases the plaintiffs have prevailed.
It has been said that an examination of the accident files of
the Air Commerce Bureau discloses that in only 20% of the cases
would it have been possible for the plaintiff to prove negligence.
This, of course, is a conclusion and honestly reached, but we cannot
concur in the conclusion.
An examination of the reports of the Secretary of Commerce,
as sent out from time to time, discloses the fact that the accident
investigation boards, in a vast majority of the cases, have worked
out a very clear and reasonable hypothesis as to why the accident
happened. Most of the evidence which justifies these hypotheses
would be evidence admissible in court and experts are always available to testify as to their opinions arising from the proven facts.
In a good many of the few cases lost by the plaintiffs there has been
a clear demonstration of both a lack of knowledge of aviation and
a lack of aviation legal precedents on the part of plaintiffs' counsel.
These results will obtain wherever the plaintiff in any kind of law
suit is adequately represented.
We see no reason why an aviation operator should be held
absolutely liable. When automobiles were new, (and even now),
very few people understood what made them go, back up, get out
of control, skid or stop, but it is not necessary to prove these things
to win an automobile damage suit. All that is needed to be shown
is what happened, not why. An examination of the cases actually
tried in aviation cases proves that the same rule is followed in
these cases.
*As far as the plaintiff being required to rebut the defendant's
explanation is concerned, that has always been necessary. If an
automobile swerves, off the road and injures a person, the driver
may still contend that a steering wheel broke and that reasonable
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care would not have disclosed the defect. The plaintiff would have
to meet this rebuttal evidence.
There appears to have been no great disadvantage to automobile
plaintiffs arising out of this rule. In fact, the advantage seems to
have been the other way.
Absolute liability for injury to passengers has never been imposed upon operators 'of steamships, steamboats, railroad trains,
street cars, automobile buses, taxicabs, or private automobiles. We
are unimpressed by the argument that it should be imposed upon
the operators of aircraft.
The offsetting of absolute liability with limitations in amount
is not an "even break" for aircraft operators. Our information
from aviation insurance companies is that requiring payment to be
made in every case of injury or death to paid passengers, and in
every case of injury, death or damage to property or persons on
the ground, will create a much greater total liability than is now,
expended in payment of judgments or in settlement of doubtful
cases. Besides, the limitation of liability is granted only upon a
guarantee of payment-i. e., compulsory insurance or bond or cash
deposit. This latter is an evil in itself.
A study of the experience of Massachusetts, the only state
which has compulsory automobile liability insurance, discloses that
insurance carriers have increased their rates 20%. This rate
increase, in turn, is due to greatly increased litigation, an increase
in fraudulent and collusive claims, an increase in contempt of automobile traffic laws, and an increased disregard of all the rules of
prudent driving.
So much for our general reasons.
We now call your attention to a few specific sections of this
Liability Act.
By Section 102, the word "operator" is defined. The registered
owner is deemed to be the operator with certain exceptions. One
of these exceptions is in the case of a lease or bailment of a plane
for more than 14 days. The reason for this limitation of 14 days
is exceedingly obscure. It would in effect prevent an air carrier
or private operator in need of emergency equipment from renting
same from someone else, if it was rented or leased for 14 days or a
shorter rental. The registered owner apparently would be liable
entirely without negligence and entirely without operation on his
part. It is like making the New York Central Railroad liable for a
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wreck resulting from the operation of a locomotive borrowed by the
Pennsylvania Railroad.
By Section 300, there is set up a limitation for liability for
injury or death to paid passengers. These limitations run from
$10,000.00 for death to $3,000.00 for the loss of an eye, and all
other injuries except death are limited to a maximum of $5,000.00.
If -there is' to be a limitation, we have no objection to these.
On the other hand, by Section 204, there is set up a limitation
of' liability for injury to persons on the ground and there is only
one limitation, to-wit, the maximum of $10,000.00. In other words,
as much as $10,000.00 may be recovered, the jury willing for anything from abrasions and nervous shock to death. From our experience in automobile cases we know that broken arms may bring
a verdict of $5,000.00 to $7,500.00, and "nervous shock" as much
as $10,000.00.
In view of the fact that there is absolute liability on all operators, commercial, private and pleasure, for damages to persons
and property on the ground, we cannot understand why there should
be greater possible recoveries for injuries in the one case than in
the other, particularly in view of the fact that insurance is required against both risks.
The total limitation for damage to persons on the ground varies
,according to the horsepower and the weight of the plane.- This, of
course, is a "copy" from the proposed Rome 'Convention of 1933.
This was an ill-fitting compromise, never ratified by the United
States. However, under the Rome Convention, the air carrier was
not absolutely liable, but could avoid liability if he proved the injured party guilty of negligence. Further, under the Rome Convention, the limitations were removed if insurance was not carried, but under the proposed Uniform Liability Act, the removal
of limitations is not the sole penalty for failure to carry insurance.
There is, in addition, a criminal penalty for flying without it.
Under Section 206, the procedure under the Liability Act is
outlined. The operator is expected to file his own suit within 60
days, naming his passengers (at least the injured ones) and his
,insurer. Notice of the suit is to be published in at least 2 newspapers in the county. (Missouri, Illinois and other backward states
please note.) We would be surprised to find all counties boasting
2 or more newspapers; in fact, we would be surprised to find that
all counties boast of even one. If the air operator does not file his
own suit within 60 days, then any injured person may file a suit
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at any time. Evidently, there is to be no statute of limitation as
to the time in which an injured person may remember he was hurt
and desire to file his suit.
Section 308 requires every air operator carrying passengers for
hire to keep a record of the name and address of each passenger.
Clearly, this applies to sight-seeing trips, as well as to the common
carrier lines. One wonders just how this would work if appliedfto
sight-seeing buses in Washington, D. C., or other cities, such as
the "trips to China Town" in New York and San Francisco. It is
a piece of unnecessary hardship to a legitimate industry, butproperly required if the rest of the act is to become law.
Section 401 makes an air carrier absolutely liable for loss to
or damage of baggage and "personal effects." This section does
not even say that the loss or damage must result from a damage
to or a wreck of the aircraft. Apparently, the air carrier is to be
liable for the work of a pickpocket, or perhaps, that of a card
sharp. We find no other form of transportation has imposed upon
it an absolute liability for hand-baggage (in the possession of the
passengers), much less for "personal effects," which would include watch and chain, personal jewelry, money, and ladies' handbags with their unbelievable contents.
Sections 501 to 507 set up the rules applicable to air collisions.
If only one operator is negligent, he alone is liable; if both, then
both are liable according to the percentage or degree of negligence.
If this degree of negligence cannot be definitely ascertained, then
the liability is to be equally divided.
The exceeding difficulty of proving comparative degrees of
negligence may for the moment, be passed over. The glaring fault
of the collision scheme is that under the absolute liability doctrine,
the carrier of passengers, though wrecked by the grossest negligence of the other plane, must first pay his own injured passengers
and then may "proceed against the other operator."
It just might happen that this other operator would come from
a state where insurance was not required and was insolvent, and
hence, the blameless operator, not at all negligent, must carry the
loss of the other's negligence definitely and finally.
We admit in all candor that picking out isolated sections of
this act for criticism without the entire context is apt to be misleading. These sections criticized are doubtless necessary and required, if the whole legislative scheme of absolute liability is to
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work. But the fact that such sections are necessary in the scheme
is indicative of the error of the whole conception.
There is one other feature of the proposed Uniform Liability
Act which should be discussed. No uniform state law has ever
been passed simultaneously by all forty-eight states. This particular
law is not the kind or character which can be passed in one state
without having serious effects in other states, particularly the adjoining states. It would not be similar to passing a uniform divorce
law or a uniform negotiable instruments law which has effect only
in the states which desire it.
For instance, an Indiana operator, complying with all the laws
of his own state, would, upon crossing the state line into Illinois
(if Illinois should pass this act), find himself guilty of a criminal
offense and liable to a $5,000.00 fine and a year's imprisonment for
flying over Illinois without the insurance required by Section 205.
If he carried a paid passenger, he would be liable for a double fine
and imprisonment for not having the insurance called for by Section 306.
The first state to pass this law would be shunned by every air
operator, as if it were plague infested . We might even see new
routes of transcontinental travel by the common carrier, if it were
possible to avoid the particular state.
The mandatory insurance provisions are practically impossible
of performance, if the law is passed by many states, for to protect one's self in each state, the aviation operator must have a
policy which appoints the Secretary of each state the insurance
carrier's agent for service. Absent such a policy, the air carrier
is guilty of criminal offense. The policy may not be cancelled
until the Aviation Commission in each state is given 15 days'
notice.
It is obvious that confusion untold will result from any effort
to get this legislation passed state by state. To have flying criminal
in one state and legal in another is to lose sight of the nature of
flying. There are no feasible boundary lines to warn the pilot when
he has crossed a state line. Not even Massachusetts-and on the
highways its boundaries are usually marked-makes it a criminal
offense for a non-resident uninsured automobilist to drive over its
roads.
We must accept as true the statement of the framers of this
Act when they say they are not unfriendly to aviation. As a corollary to that, we must attribute such penal legislation as this to the
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lack of appreciation of the necessities of the case, to a misconception of the desirability of the object sought to be obtained, and to
a misunderstanding of the effect of the legislation and of the
nature of the industry sought to be thus regulated.
Finally we are told the Uniform Acts are an endeavor to bring
our domestic law in line with our international private law. Our
earlier analysis demonstrates that' the framers of the proposed
legislation under consideration must have rejected the general plan
of the Warsaw Convention (dealing with persons, baggage and
goods) in spite of the fact that it has worked well thus far (particularly in the Hindenberg disaster settlements), was adhered to
by the United States effective October 29, 1934; and governs international flying almost everywhere.
Except for Portugal, it is the law of Europe and her Colonies,
of Russia, of Mexico and of Brazil. It is a modified res ipsa
loquitur (the thing speaks for itself) plan in that the air carrier is
prima facie absolutely liable regardless of negligence for the injury
of a passenger, with a limitation of $8,300.00 On the other hand
the air carrier may completely defeat liability by establishing that
there was no negligence up to the moment of the accident, and the
passenger may recover his provable damages without limit if he can
establish that the accident was caused by the carrier's wilful misconduct or its equivalent.
Then, it must be that the framers of the Uniform Acts must
be seeking to follow the pattern of the Rome Convention of 1933.
If so, the model has feet of clay, for the Rome Convention with
its ground liability insurance plan has been shunned by practically
all of its twenty-six signatory powers, so far as adherence is concerned. The true answer is found in the inability of European insurers to provide insurance under the Rome plan,-and this on the
European Continent where practically every flight involves the crossing of an international border and its attendant necessity of protecting nationals from internationals. No such situation exists in
the United States from either an international or domestic standpoint. Already the Rome Convent'ion is the subject of considerable
doctoring,-a protocol having been presented at Brussels this September. The Rome Convention has not been ratified by the United
States and we would do well to shelve it entirely for the time being.
.-ence it is hard for your committee to understand how the proposed Uniform Acts accomplish any uniformity with treaty law,
wherthe drafts reject the already working plan of one treaty, with
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its large international coverage, and embrace the substance of another treaty which experience has proved a "dead horse."
UNIFORM

LAW OF AIRFLIGHT

The second of the proposed uniform codes is called "The Uniform Law of Airflight." It has 'only one majo" section. Many
definitions, notably that of "operator," so voluminously defined in
the Uniform Aviation Liability Act, are lacking. Doubtless, it
was presumed that both of these acts would be simultaneously
passed and the lack of definition in the Uniform Law of Airflight
might be made up by reference to the definition in the Uniform
Aviation Liability Act.
However, as that may be, the principal section of this act is
Section 2, which is as follows:
"Section 2. (Lawfulness of Flight.) Flight of aircraft in
this State is lawful:
(a)' If the operator of the aircraft holds a valid certificate of airworthiness from the (State Aeronautics Commisssion), or the proper agency
of the Government of the United States and the aircraft is being navigated
by a pilot holding a valid certificate of competency issued by the (State
Aeronautics Commission) or the proper agency of the Government of the
United States; and
(b) If at a height permitted by the rules, regulations or orders adopted
and promulgated by the (State Aeronautics Commission), and the applicable
rules of the proper agency of the Government of the United States; and
(c) Unless so conducted as to involve a substantial risk of harm to
individuals or property on the land; or
(d) Unless so conducted as to constitute a substantial interference
with the then existing use and enjoyment of the land or structures on the
land or space over the land or adversely affect the then existing value of
the land and structures thereon."

This section seems, therefore, to be particularly inept by reason
both of things omitted and of things included. In the first place,
the bald statement is made that flight is lawful if-(a), (b), (c)
and (d). This would be an untruth in many states, or, at best, a
partial truth. In most states where there are regulations of flying,
a flight is not lawful if only the height regulation is obeyed. Most
states have other regulations, a violation of which may occur at
almost any height. Under the new Federal law, there will be many
regulations affecting flight which we formerly thought of as purely

intrastate.

Consequently, the statement in this section that such

flight is lawful would be a contradiction in terms of the state regu-
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latory act of the Federal law, and of the regulations issued thereunder.
Further, a "valid certificate of competency" is not all that is
needed to make flight legal. Much depends upon the nature of
the flight, its purpose and business. A "private pilot" could violate
the law if he carried pay passengers, but nevertheless his certificate
is a "valid certificate of competency."
Perhaps the framers of this act had a different meaning for
the word "valid." But "valid" to us would seem to include that
it was honestly, and not fraudulently, issued, that it had not expired and had not been cancelled. Perhaps more was meant.
Aside from these, there is a much more serious objection. The
law says that flight is lawful unless(d)

Unless so conducted as to constitute a substantial interference with

the then existing use and enjoyment of the land or structures on the land
or space over the land and structures thereon,

By inference, at least, flight is unlawful if it constitutes a
substantial interference with the use, etc., or adversely affects the
then existing value.
There are, of course, many instances dependent upon all of the
surrounding circumstances where flight might constitute a nuisance,
and wherever it is a nuisance we quite agree that such flight is
unlawful and may result either in an injunction against it or in
recoverable damages. However, interference with the use of private
property is not alone unlawful.
A church bell may interfere with sleep; so may automobiles,
newsboys, fire engines, ambulances, trains and street cars. To this
extent they may "substantially interfere with the use" of private
property used as dwellings, apartments, or hotels, but none of these
things are unlawful.
To say that flight of a common carrier over an established airway is unlawful, because it "substantially interferes with the use"
of the underlying land, is to state a legal untruth. Suppose, for
instance, that an enterprising farmer, whose land is under an established airway, should conceive the idea of establishing a nudist
camp or a sun-bathing health resort. Obviously, flying over it
would interfere with its use for that purpose, but we do not conceive of any court holding that the flight, for that reason, would be
unlawful; that it might be otherwise if not under an established airway, we concede. It is just one of the defects of this act that it is
too broad and takes in too much territory.
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Then, again, this act says (inferentially) that flight is unlawful
if it interferes with the use of the land or of the "space over the
land." The question immediately arises as to whose use of the
space is meant. Who is using the space over the land? Neither
buildings nor trees nor flagpoles nor wires nor transmission towers
are space, nor do we conceive that the person who has erected them
is "using" space. He has displaced space-or filled it with contents.
The aviator is just as much entitled to use space as the land owner.
The new Federal law recognizes that the navigable airspace is subject to an absolute right of air passage, by any person, in "Air
Commerce." The new definition of air commerce includes practically all flight. Unless the land owner be an aviator operator
himself, we do not see how he is using "the space over the land."
When it comes to the phrase, "adversely affect the then existing value," we find that this is even a greater departure from
established law. It would be no news to a real estate dealer that
the erection of an apartment house or a store of any kind or a
filling station or movie theatre adjacent to or even within the same
block as a dwelling house "adversely affects its value." An unsightly vacant lot does the same thing. But it would be, indeed
news if any of these things, absent local ordinances, would be
deemed unlawful. Besides, these things which we have mentioned
are permanent in their nature, but flight is a momentary thing.
Yet, under this act there is nothing to prevent a land owner from
claiming, by inference at least, that a single flight adversely affected
the value of his land and hence it was unlawful.
Finally, it will be observed that this act does not say that a
flight is unlawful if improperly conducted as to interfere with the
use or adversely affect the value, but it merely says if it is "so conducted." Legitimate business properly conducted has never had
imposed upon it the servitude of being unlawful, unless, as said
before, under the many facts and circumstances involved, it might
be held to constitute a nuisance.
This particular section of this act is in the alleged interest of the
land owner. It has been the subject of at least ten years of controversy. There are those who have proclaimed for years that the
land owner owns the airspace and who, in spite of all the court
decisions, still believe that "cujus solum est, etc." has a sacred halo.
We believe the time has come to bury the halo, once and for all.
They have offered this section in the nature of a compromise.
They would grant a limited "right of flight" in exchange for abso-
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lute liability. They expect the aviation operator to submit to the
absolute liability in exchange for what is clearly not freedom of
flight.
There was a time when the weight of the venerable maxim
persuaded some of us that such a compromise might be advantageous. England adopted a similar compromise in 1920, but it
was a better trade than now offered. The right of flight granted
in England was not hampered by "interference with use" or "adversely affecting value."
But England made her compromise too soon, and made it before
any court had had a chance to declare that the venerable maxim
'that he who owns the soil owns to the zenith' did not tell the legal
truth. The one here offered is presented too late. The land owners
have nothing to offer. Court decisions and the Federal Act have
taught us this. We now know that they do not own the airspace.
The right of flight is just as clear and just as untrammeled as the
right to drive an automobile, and much broader. The right to drive
an automobile is limited to public ways. All of the airspace is
public. Absent the sovereign right of the government or of the
state to set aside restricted airspaces, there is no privately owned
airspace.
This, of course, does not mean that the right of flight is any
more free from legislative limitation than the driving of an automobile. It is subject to the rule that it must not be so used as to
unnecessarily interfere with the rights of others. Flight which
constitutes a nuisance is unlawful. The common law has already
declared that. It is clear from the decisions in this country that no
statute is necessary to amplify it. But that is a far cry from saying
that any flight which "substantially interferes with use" or "adversely affects value" is unlawful.
Nor do we mean that the land owner has no rights in airspace.
We simply mean he doesn't own it. But arising out of and incident to his ownership of the land, he has the right to the full enjoyment of his land consistent with the rights of other people. We
include aviators as people. One of these rights would be clearly
to build on the land and enclose or fill the airspace, again consistent with the rights of other people. More than that the land
owner never had.
Queerly enough, the framers of this act have not said that the
converse of their proposed lawful flights would be unlawful. No
penalties have been prescribed. They are unlawful only by infer-
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ence. Obviously, the sole purpose of the act is to create additional
rights in the land owners.
No such act is needed to create the right of flight. Flying has
been going on now for many years in all of the states of the Union
without any such act.
UNIFORM AIR JURISDICTION ACT

The third proposed Uniform Code is called the Uniform Air
Jurisdiction Act.
Section 1 relates to the jurisdiction over contracts and merely
provides that contracts and legal relations entered into in the air
shall have the same effect as if entered into on the land.
There is no objection to this. In fact, we see no need of it.
It is simply declarative of the common law.
The second section provides for jurisdiction in torts and crimes
and may serve a useful purpose in relieving doubt in criminal prosecutions. We see no objection to it and believe it is a good law to
be enacted.
Summarizing, your committee recommends that this Association
go on record as opposing, in their present form, the Uniform Aviation Liability Act and the Uniform Law of Airflight, and that the
Association recommend the passage of the Uniform Air Jurisdiction
Act. The committee further recommends a continuation of a study
committee to the end that there be vigilance by the states and cooperation by them with the Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.

